Infection acquired in a hospital ward may directly cause disease; or it may create a symptomless carrier. Efforts to control infection must concern both of these processes, because though a symptomless carrier himself suffers no immediate harm, he remains a source from which others may be more seriously infected; moreover, he may re-infect himself if the organisms find their way from the site of carriage to some more susceptible tissue. The success of preventive measures must therefore be judged not only by their immediate effect on disease but also by their control of carrier rates for pathogenic organisms.
There are many ways by which bacteria may reach a patient, but none is necessarily more important than any of the others. So the value of many precautions that are now taken remains uncertain. The hope is sometimes expressed that with more detailed knowledge of the ways by which bacteria spread in a ward we may be able to concentrate on only a few but vitally important precautions, and to relax the many others that make our present system so tedious and so fallible. This hope will be fulfilled only if bacteria behave themselves: if all species and all strains spread in the same way at all times. There is no evidence that this is so and though some broad generalizations may be possible, categorical support or condemnation of any precaution cannot be based on its success or failure on a particular occasion. Assessment of the value of precautions against infection is difficult for yet another reason. Gillespie, Alder, Ayliffe, Bradbeer, and Wypkema (1959) found that several precautions, which by themselves had no discernible effect on infection rates, had a significant effect when applied together. Lack of effect from applying or withdrawing any one procedure must therefore be interpreted very cautiously. With these difficulties of interpretation and much conflicting evidence in mind, the physician or surgeon must choose the methods that he will apply in his own wards.
There are, perhaps, four basic principles of ward procedure for the control Thomas, 1956; Hare and Ridley, 1958; Eichenwald, Kotsevalov, and Fasso, 1960) , and studies of airborne spread will have to be made with subjects who are known to be profuse 'dispersers' before final conclusions can be reached on the importance of this method of studying spread of infection. For all this, there are many examples of failure to control the spread of Staph. aureus by barrier nursing, and, whether these are due to inadequacy of the system or failure to apply it properly, it cannot be recommended as a reliable method.
Isolation in a ward side-room is perhaps more often successful but failures are many if the patient is simply moved into it and attended in the usual way by nurses who also have to deal with uninfected patients in the main ward. Side-ward isolation should therefore always include the full ritual of barrier nursing as a safeguard against contact infection. Thus, all equipment needed for the patient is kept in the isolation room or is disinfected or destroyed as soon as it is brought out; ward staff wear gowns (which are kept in the isolation area) and masks when attending the patient and wash their hands before and after doing so.
Isolation rooms for septic patients should be ventilated by simple exhaust fans discharging to the outside so that air flows into them and not from them to the main ward. For patients who are being isolated for protection against infection, airflow in the opposite direction is theoretically needed but a reasonable compromise is to switch off the exhaust fan and to rely on natural ventilation from an open window. The door of an isolation room should be kept closed.
Full isolation requires nurses who do not attend uninfected patients, and a separate room for each patient in a building set away from the general wards. Isolation units such as this are not part of the usual hospital design in Britain but they have sometimes been improvised during an emergency and, remaining in use afterwards, have shown their value by apparently limiting the spread of infection from occasional septic patients during non-epidemic times.
Only recently has the number of isolation rooms required for the control of infection become the subject of quantitative study. Results of current studies are not yet available but it seems likely that at least 30% of surgical and 15% of medical beds will be required. In most British hospitals such generous isolation facilities are not yet available and until they are, anything approaching full control of staphylococcal infection will be difficult.
Segregation During an outbreak of sepsis when there are more patients for isolation than there are rooms to put them in, an acceptable substitute for isolation is segregation, whereby infected patients are collected together in a special ward. This does not, of course, prevent them from re-infecting each other and it is a method that can only be accepted if there is no possibility of proper isolation. It is, however, infinitely preferable to leaving the septic and clean patients together in the same ward. PREVENTION 
Control of infection in hospital wards
Clothing The aprons and dresses of nurses attending infected patients, especially children who must often be lifted and carried, are sometimes heavily contaminated after only one day's wearing (Potter and Blowers, unpublished observations in a burns unit). Thus there seems some justification for a one-piece uniform, changed daily, instead of the usual daily clean apron and a dress that is worn for a week. Besides its possible bacteriological advantages, this means one less item of laundry each week than does the older system.
Cotton gowns offer only incomplete protection against contamination in either direction but they seem to be of some value (Cook, Parrish, and Shooter, 1958) so they should be worn over the uniform at least during wound dressings and during attention to patients in isolation. Impervious plastic gowns, disinfected by wiping with a hypochlorite solution containing 1% available chlorine1, give better protection and seem preferable to cotton gowns for barrier nursing and isolation techniques.
CONTROL OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION
For many years, and especially in the last few, bacteriologists have been busy discovering inanimate reservoirs of pathogenic organisms in hospitals walls, floors, ceilings, and furniture; bed-clothes, curtains, and crockery; and the air-while methods for disinfecting them have been increasing the cost and complexity of ward management. These activities should certainly not be discouraged, because the discovery of reservoirs and the invention of methods for disinfecting them are essential preliminaries to the full study of such organisms. It cannot be denied that disinfection of the whole environment is essential when there has been known heavy contamination with dangerous organisms. The need for frequent and energetic environmental decontamination at other times is less certain. Theoretically, it should reduce the risk of infection at any time, but whether or not it does so significantly has not been conclusively shown. Unfortunately, clear evidence on this point is not easy to obtain because, as has already been pointed out, the complexity of bacterial spread makes the evaluation of each pathway very difficult. Enthusiasts for particular methods will no doubt continue to apply them but it is hoped that they will accept responsibility for the steady, even though laborious, collection of evidence to support their views, rather than becoming tedious crusaders for unproven causes. Gillespie, Simpson, and Tozer (1958) who found that regular blanket disinfection as the only new precaution had no detectable influence on Staph. aureus sepsis or carrier rates, but when applied with other precautions appeared to play a part in their control.
Whether or not this fairly expensive routine is wholly justified on bacteriological grounds, apart from its obvious aesthetic desirability, remains to be shown. In the meantime, the following routine is suggested as a minimum standard:
(1) Sheets should be laundered at least weekly and whenever a bed is vacated.
(2) Blankets, mattresses, and pillows should be disinfected (a) every three months; (b) whenever visibly soiled; (c) after use by any infected patient who has been isolated or should have been isolated according to the indications already given; (d) after use by every patient during an outbreak that has resisted the routine precautions; (e) before reopening a ward that has been closed because of infection.
Woollen blankets may be disinfected by washing them at the usual low temperature and using a detergent combined with a quaternary ammonium or other suitable disinfectant substance'. It was once hoped that incorporation of the disinfectant in the last rinse instead of the washing stage would confer self-disinfecting properties on the blankets. But though fibres from blankets so treated cause zones of inhibition on a culture plate seeded with staphylococci, there is no appreciable killing of organisms in the blanket itself during use, presumably because the disinfectant does not act when dry. Woollen blankets may also be disinfected by hightemperature washing provided this is just below boiling point (British Launderers' Research Association and International Wool Secretariat, 1959) . This causes no more damage to the blankets than the low-temperature wash but woollen blankets will stand only about 60 washes in any case, so disinfecting them regularly must always be fairly expensive. Cotton cellular or terry-towelling blankets are easily disinfected by washing at boiling point or just below and will stand several hundred such treatments (Blowers, Potter, and Wallace, 1957 One other procedure of vital importance in the prevention of nursery epidemics is the preparation and bottling of feeds for the babies. This should be done by a nurse who does not handle the babies and in a department set aside and equipped for the purpose. Suitable equipment and recommended methods cannot be fully discussed here and the reader is referred to the detailed recommendations of Perkins (1956) .
THE AIR There is yet no conclusive evidence of the importance of airborne infection in wards. Direct infection by this route of properly covered surgical wounds seems unlikely, but staphylococcal infection of the respiratory tract causing pneumonia or symptomless nasal carriage seem real possibilities. Plenum ventilation with a high exchange rate as used in operation theatres would reduce the number of airborne organisms but the cost of applying it to a whole hospital would be enormous. Recirculation ventilation of wards, with filtration to remove bacteria, is less expensive but its effect on infection is not known. Recirculation systems without filtration and serving a whole hospital may actually assist the spread of infection between wards. Hudson, Sanger, and Sproul (1959) suggest treating the air and entire ward contents with a long-acting disinfectant, bis (n-tributyl) tin oxide. This reduces the number of airborne organisms by about four-fifths but the effect on infection is not yet known.
1 Hibitane (Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd.); 0-5°% alcoholic solution or the I % obstetric cream are both effective for scale pans.
The most recently proposed method (Elek and Fleming, 1960) The setting of dressing trolleys is simplified and thus made safer by using individual dressing packs, disposable gallipots, and disposable paper bags for dirty dressings.
One further improvement in dressing technique is now available, namely, the use of water-repellent dressing towels. The usual dressing towels are waterabsorbent so that wet instruments placed on them may be contaminated when the water soaks through to an unsterile table top beneath (Fig. 1) . It is sometimes necessary to put a towel over the bedclothes around the wound and though instruments should not be placed on this, they sometimes are, when the risk of contamination is even greater. Some types of disposable paper dressing towels are even more absorbent than cotton so may increase rather than reduce, as is claimed, the risk of infection. Cotton fabrics of the Ventile1 type do not allow water to soak through it unless it is very hot. These materials are being successfully used for the sleeves of surgeons' gowns to prevent skin organisms passing through to the wound when the sleeves are wetted, FIG. 1. Wet forceps on an ordinary cotton dressing towel. The water soaks through to the underlying surface, from which the instrument may then be contaminated.
as they often are during an operation. A more recent application is to use Ventile fabrics for dressing towels to reduce the risk of contamination from underlying surfaces. Drops of water remaining on a Ventile dressing-towel without soaking through are shown in Fig. 2 .
Wound Dressing Rooms The value of specially ventilated wound dressing rooms has been clearly shown by Bourdillon and Colebrook (1946) and by Lowbury (1954) . For patients in open wards all wounds, whether infected or clean, should therefore be done in a specially equipped and ventilated dressing-room. For patients already in isolation, however, the dressing should be done in the isolation room unless it is so complicated that the special facilities of the dressing-room are essential.
A dressing-room that is used for septic work soon becomes a concentration area for pathogenic organisms unless it is thoroughly cleaned after every session of dressings and unless it is specially ventilated. Positive-pressure ventilation, as recommended by Bourdillon and Colebrook, prevents contamination of clean wounds with airborne organisms from the wards. For a dressing-room that is often used for septic wounds and closely communicates with a ward, however, this may cause heavy contamination of the ward so a balanced ventilation system with input and extraction fans of equal capacity is preferable. A described by Williams, Blowers, Garrod, and Shooter (1960) .
CONTINUOUS SUCTION APPARATUS Surgery of the urinary tract is complicated by post-operative infection perhaps more often than any other type of surgery. Most of this infection depends on common but avoidable faults of indwelling catheter drainage systems. Pyrah, Goldie, Parsons, and Raper (1955) and Miller, Gillespie, Linton, Slade, and Mitchell (1958, 1960) show that post-operative urinary sepsis is all but eliminated by using closed drainage apparatus. In many wards, any urine drainage system using a bunged bottle is accepted as a closed one but this is far from being so. Miller and his colleagues showed that even temporary disconnexion of the system for bladder irrigation or for some other reason allowed infection to occur as often as did an open drainage system. Their apparatus, which is strongly recommended, includes an irrigation attachment that can be used without breaking the closed system. Failure to sterilize an already infected bladder is often due to its constant reinfection by organisms that ascend from the accumulated urine in the bottle. This is prevented by putting 100 ml. of formalin in the bottle.
Drainage from the thoracic cavity, too, often allows infection unless a closed system is used. For this, however, a disinfectant cannot be put in the bottle because it may be aspirated into the chest during coughing. Contamination of the fluid should be prevented by a cottonwool plug in the air outlet tube and by changing the bottles with the aseptic care of a surgical operation.
